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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1934, a group of Nebraskans, excited about the possibility of a
new form of efficient, transparent1 state government, collected
roughly sixty thousand signatures to place the following language on
the general election ballot:
An amendment to the Constitution of Nebraska providing that beginning with
the regular season of the legislature in 1937 the legislative authority of the
state shall be vested in a legislature consisting of one house of not less than
thirty nor more than fifty members, the members to be nominated and elected
in a non-partisan manner.2
Nearly 60% of voters voted in support of the initiative and Nebraska
adopted the only unicameral, non-partisan state legislature in the
United States.3 Like the introduction of ballot measures during the
Progressive Reform movement in the early twentieth century, the cre-
ation of Nebraska’s Unicameral responded to a desire to curb abuses
of power and corruption in government.4 While Nebraskans do not use
1. See History of the Nebraska Unicameral: The Birth of a Unicameral, NEB. LEGIS-
LATURE, https://nebraskalegislature.gov/about/history_unicameral.php [https://
perma.unl.edu/3CVH-7PEM] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019).
2. TRAVIS MOORE, NEB. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH OFFICE, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
IN NEBRASKA 9 (2017), https://nebraskalegislature.gov/pdf/reports/research/initia-
tive_referendum_2017.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/9Y8L-MY88].
3. Id.
4. Id. at 7. States’ adoption of ballot measures as a means for enacting public policy,
including Nebraska’s adoption of such measures in 1912, grew out of the Progres-
sive Era as American interest in forms of direct democracy increased in the 1880s
and 1890s. See also Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot
Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 54 (1995)
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ballot measures nearly as frequently as other states,5 ballot measures
play an important role in the state’s history and raise questions about
the role courts should play in reviewing challenges to ballot measures.
This Comment argues that the appropriate level of judicial review
of ballot measures is (1) high deference to voters and “[liberal con-
struction] to promote the democratic process”6 in reviewing procedural
challenges before the election, and (2) “legislative mirroring” for chal-
lenges to newly enacted laws after an election. This Comment uses the
repeal and reinstatement of the death penalty in Nebraska as a case
study on the use of ballot measures, the limitations of using ballot
measures to create public policy, and the important role of Nebraska
courts in recognizing that ballot measures are both “[t]he first power
reserved by the people”7 and the expression of a “majority . . . united
by a common interest” where “the rights of the minority will be
insecure.”8
Section II.A introduces the current trend toward more voter-led
ballot measures in states across the country. Additionally, section II.A
examines the reasons for this trend and how ballot measures provide
a solution to voters’ heightened disillusion with governmental institu-
tions. A discussion of judicial responses to legal challenges to ballot
measures follows in section II.B, which includes three different per-
spectives on the role courts should assume in reviewing the measures.
Then, section II.C uses the death penalty ballot referendum in Ne-
braska as a case study, examining the background of the issue, the
pre-election challenge to the ballot measure in Hargesheimer v. Gale,
and subsequent legal challenges post-election. Part III argues that the
voter-deferential approach adopted by Nebraska courts should con-
tinue to be applied pre-election, but post-election, laws enacted
through ballot measures should be reviewed with the same level of
scrutiny applied to comparable laws passed by the legislature. Finally,
the conclusion in Part IV discusses the potential implications of the
voter-led ballot measure trend in upcoming elections.
(noting that nineteen states authorized statewide ballot measures between 1898
and 1918).
5. See, e.g., CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, INITIATIVE TOTALS BY SUMMARY YEAR 1912 – JANU-
ARY 2019 (2019), https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov//ballot-measures/pdf/initiative-
totals-summary-year.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/YLM6-NZUJ]. Between 1912
and January 2019, Californians qualified 376 ballot measures for their election
ballots. Id.
6. Stewart v. Advanced Gaming Techs., Inc., 272 Neb. 471, 485, 723 N.W.2d 65, 77
(2006).
7. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The first power reserved by the people is the initiative
whereby laws may be enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the
people independently of the Legislature.”).
8. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 265 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Current Climate: Increased Voter-Led Ballot Measures
1. Recent Trend Toward Policy Creation Through Voter-Led
Ballot Measures
Over the past few years, and particularly since the November 2016
election, legislative change through voter-led ballot measures has
trended upwards.9 This Comment uses the term “ballot measures”
broadly to refer to instances where proponents of a particular policy
collect a designated number of signatures to place the issue on an elec-
tion ballot and allow voters to directly decide whether to support or
oppose the issues without relying on elected officials.10 During the
2018 elections, there were more than 150 ballot measures11 in thirty-
seven states.12 The initiatives covered some of the country’s most con-
tentious issues: health care, criminal justice reform, legalization of
marijuana, transgender rights, and voting rights.13
Before the recent upward trend in ballot measures, there was a
long-term trend of decreasing ballot measures in states since 2006,
largely because state legislatures put fewer constitutional amend-
ments on ballots.14 However, 2016 marked a turnaround with “an un-
9. Vann R. Newkirk II, American Voters Are Turning to Direct Democracy, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/04/citizen-bal-
lot-initiatives-2018-elections/558098/ [https://perma.unl.edu/EMH5-9RCF].
10. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2. In Nebraska, if the proposed ballot initiative is to
enact a law, 7% of registered voters must sign the petition. Id. If the proposed
initiative is for a constitutional amendment, 10% of registered voters must sign.
Id. In both instances, the petition signatures must consist of at least 5% of regis-
tered voters in two-fifths of the Nebraska counties. Id. For ballot referendums, a
total of 5% of registered voters must sign the petition and the signatures must be
from 5% of the registered voters in two-fifths of the Nebraska counties. Id. at art.
III, § 3. In Nebraska, ballot measures include both ballot initiatives and referen-
dums. An initiative allows citizens to propose a statute or constitutional amend-
ment. See MOORE, supra note 2, at 4. A referendum allows voters to “refer” laws
passed by the legislature to the ballot for voters to repeal or approve. Id. at 5.
Terms and definitions vary by state. Additionally, many ballot measures occur at
the city level, both in Nebraska and elsewhere. For more information and termi-
nology, see NEB. SEC’Y OF STATE, HOW TO USE THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
PROCESS IN NEBRASKA: THE PETITION PROCESS (2019), https://sos.nebraska.gov/
sites/sos.nebraska.gov/files/doc/elections/2018/state-initiative-and-referendum-
packet.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/Z3BJ-PG2P].
11. Dana Goldstein & Kirk Johnson, Voters Weigh In on Key Issues Through More
than 150 Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/06/us/politics/ballot-initiatives-referendum.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
RKD4-6YNR].
12. Jim Carlton, Voters in 37 States to Decide Ballot Measures, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5,
2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/voters-in-37-states-to-decide-ballot-
measures-1541413801 [https://perma.unl.edu/TR9V-UKME].
13. Goldstein & Johnson, supra note 11.
14. Newkirk, supra note 9.
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deniable increase in the interest and the number” of ballot
measures.15 The total number of voter-led ballot measures that made
it to the ballot in 2016 more than doubled the total amount from
2014.16 This means that while state legislatures have been putting
fewer issues on the ballot, voters themselves have been rapidly in-
creasing the number of citizen-led measures.17 Perhaps most signifi-
cantly, ballot measures are becoming a more important vehicle for
changing public policy in conservative states that have not tradition-
ally used them, including Nebraska.18
2. Reasons for the Trend: Americans’ Heightened Distrust of
Government and the Political Process
The increase in voter-led ballot measures corresponds with Ameri-
cans’ heightened distrust of government and disillusion with voters’
ability to effect change through the political process.19 According to
the Economist’s annual Democracy Index report, the United States
qualified as a flawed democracy for the third year in a row in 2018.20
Explaining why voters seek alternative ways to change policy, the re-
port states:
The US has fallen in the global rankings over the past decade . . . . This prima-
rily reflects a deterioration in the functioning of government category, as polit-
ical polarisation has become more pronounced and public confidence in
institutions has weakened. Public frustration with institutions has been brew-
ing for years . . . .21
While public frustration has been deepening for years, it recently
reached a tipping point as President Donald Trump “tapped into parti-
15. Id. (quoting a statement by Josh Altic, director of a ballot initiatives project for
the online political encyclopedia Ballotpedia).
16. Id. There were 71 ballot measures on state ballots in 2016, which represented a
“high-water mark in elections over the past decade.” Id. That number more than
doubled for the 2018 election. See Goldstein & Johnson, supra note 11.
17. Newkirk, supra note 9.
18. See Brady Dennis & David Weigel, From Medicaid to Minimum Wage, Even Red





19. See Joshua J. Dyck & Edward L. Lascher Jr., Expanding Direct Democracy Won’t
Make Americans Feel Better About Politics, SALON (Sept. 22, 2019, 10:59 AM),
https://www.salon.com/2019/09/22/expanding-direct-democracy-wont-make-
americans-feel-better-about-politics_partner/ [https://perma.unl.edu/6VR3-QPZ3]
(arguing that Americans are using ballot measures in response to an increased
dissatisfaction with representative democracy, partisan divisions, and a distrust
that the system will produce their desired results).
20. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, DEMOCRACY INDEX 2018: ME TOO? 10–12 (2019),
https://275rzy1ul4252pt1hv2dqyuf-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
2019/01/Democracy_Index_2018.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/D4TK-GCM2].
21. Id. at 11.
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san tensions,”22 continuing Congress’s gridlock and ineffectiveness—
so much so that members of Congress themselves express frustration
with the disfunction.23 Further, two-thirds of adults in the U.S. think
that other Americans have little to no confidence in the federal gov-
ernment, and most think that faith in the government—and one an-
other—continues to shrink.24 The majority of Americans also believe
that the distrust in other citizens and the government makes it more
difficult to solve some of the country’s most pressing problems.25
In this environment of heightened distrust of political and govern-
mental institutions, ballot measures serve a variety of benefits and
give voters an outlet to directly decide policy issues without relying on
elected officials. Citizen-led ballot measures provide an opportunity
for voters to use direct democracy to bypass their state legislatures
and create new laws, particularly “where a bipartisan consensus
among voters on a specific policy wasn’t matched by members of the
legislature.”26 The widespread success of ballot initiatives across the
ideological spectrum during the 2018 election showed the power of ini-
tiatives in furthering citizens’ political priorities, especially where the
priorities did not align with the priorities of their elected officials.27
Ballot measures further serve as a means for voters to take control of
democracy and improve the effectiveness of government, as seen with
ballot measures that attempt to end partisan gerrymandering,
increase voter access, and increase transparency in campaign
financing.28
22. Id.
23. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only
Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/3Q9Y-YSMX] (“The sense of gloom is bipartisan. . . . And few
lawmakers can muster a word of pride in their institution.”).
24. LEE RAINIE ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., Trust and Distrust in America 3 (2019), https://
www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/trust-and-distrust-in-america/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/68Z7-32SM].
25. Id. According to three surveys conducted by Pew Research Center between Sep-
tember 2018 and March 2019, American adults consider the following to be “very
big problem[s]” facing the country: drug addiction, affordability of health care,
ethics in government, affordability of higher education, the ability of Republicans
and Democrats to work together, the role of special interest groups in Washing-
ton, the operation of the political system, the wealth gap between rich and poor,
made-up news and information, violent crime, climate change, Americans’ level of
agreement on basic facts, Americans’ level of confidence in the federal govern-
ment, racism, illegal immigration, the quality of K-12 public schools, terrorism,
sexism, Americans’ level of confidence in each other, and job opportunities. Id.
26. Newkirk, supra note 9.
27. See Ilana Cohen, The Power of Ballot Initiatives, HARV. POL. REV. (Dec. 10, 2018),
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/the-power-of-ballot-initiatives/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/45L5-NQKP].
28. Democracy on the 2018 Ballot: Voters Take on Reform in Their States and Towns,
CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR. (Oct. 3, 2018), https://campaignlegal.org/update/democ-
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3. Voter-Led Ballot Measures Are Often Challenged in State
Courts, Making Courts an Important Player in the
Ballot Measure Process
The rise in voter-led ballot measures also means that state courts
are placed in an important position because many ballot measures
face legal challenges from opponents. There are generally two types of
legal challenges to ballot measures: procedural and substantive.29
Procedural challenges typically allege that the ballot initiative propo-
nents did not comply with the required procedures to place the issue
on the ballot,30 including failure to meet deadlines or obtain sufficient
signatures. Procedural challenges almost always occur before an elec-
tion, which determines whether an issue can appear before voters on
the ballot.31
Substantive challenges, on the other hand, generally allege that
the topic or function of the ballot measure oversteps state-imposed
subject matter requirements.32 Many, but not all, courts postpone
review of substantive challenges to ballot measures until after the
election, unless the subject of the measure is clearly invalid.33 Justifi-
cations of post-election review of substantive challenges to ballot mea-
sures include (1) preserving judicial economy by waiting to see if a
measure passes before reviewing it, and (2) maintaining separation of
powers by limiting a court’s pre-election review of measures for the
same reasons a court does not review legislation until after it is en-
acted.34 However, the courts that conduct pre-election review of sub-
stantive challenges justify their actions by distinguishing between the
legislative process and the ballot measure process; when legislatures
propose a bill, the proposed law can be altered at any time until it is
enacted, but the language submitted to voters in ballot measures can-
not be altered.35
racy-2018-ballot-voters-take-reform-their-states-and-towns [https://perma.
unl.edu/WR4N-RYX5]; see also Jon Kamp, On the Ballot in Some States Ahead of
2020: The Right to Vote, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/fall-ballot-decisions-on-voters-rights-to-influence-2020-
race-1533124929 [https://perma.unl.edu/FD9K-3N35] (stating that ballot initia-
tives across the country are giving voters the chance to “expand or limit access to
the polls” ahead of the 2020 election).
29. ELIZABETH BIRCHER, ELECTION LAW MANUAL: CHAPTER 4: STATE REGULATION OF
BALLOT MEASURES 9 (2008), http://www.electionlawissues.org/Resources/Election-
Law-Manual.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/S3WD-VY8U].
30. See id. at 9–10.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 11.
33. Id. A measure could be “clearly invalid” if the proposed law would be unconstitu-
tional under the state or federal constitution or if the proposal exceeds the
bounds of state-approved topics for ballot measures. Id.
34. Id. at 12.
35. Id.
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After a wave of successful ballot measures in the 2018 election, le-
gal challenges to these ballot measures arose across the country. In
Florida, for example, courts reviewed several lawsuits against ballot
measures passed in the 2018 election.36 Other state courts reviewed
multiple ballot measure lawsuits, including Arizona,37 Missouri,38
36. See Cty. of Volusia v. Detzner, 253 So. 3d 507 (Fla. 2018). Two counties sued the
Florida Department of State and Secretary of State arguing that the ballot title
and summary of a ballot measure, Amendment 10, misled voters by failing to
describe the measure’s chief purpose. Id. at 510. For more information about this
pre-election lawsuit, see Mary Ellen Klas, Miami-Dade Sues to Block Amendment
That Would Force It to Have an Elected Sheriff, MIAMI HERALD (July 17, 2018,
6:30 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/arti-
cle215034905.html [https://perma.unl.edu/NVG2-BN5B] (explaining that Miami-
Dade joined the two other counties seeking to invalidate Amendment 10, which
was set to appear on the November ballot, arguing that it was misleading to vot-
ers). One of the counties involved in the first lawsuit, Volusia County, filed an-
other lawsuit after Florida voters approved Amendment 10. See Jim Saunders,
Volusia County Sues to Get Exempted from Amendment 10, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Dec. 18, 2018, 6:45 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-ne-volusia-
county-amendment-10-20181218-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/M6L7-QXDZ]
(explaining that after voters approved Amendment 10, Volusia County sued the
Governor and Secretary of State of Florida claiming that the measure should not
have a retroactive effect). Additionally, there were other ballot measure lawsuits
reviewed in Florida related to different ballot issues. See Gary Fineout, Victims’
Rights Amendment Could Be Taken off Florida Ballot, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July
16, 2018, 8:25 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-marsys-law-bal-
lot-amendment-20180716-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Z4AX-MV3X]
(describing pre-election challenge to ballot measure establishing crime victims’
rights); Dara Kam, Greyhound Association Sues Over Amendment to Ban Dog
Racing, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (May 17, 2018, 2:20 PM), http://www.sun-senti-
nel.com/news/politics/florida-politics-blog/fl-reg-greyhound-racing-challenge-
20180517-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/3DAF-BJ3N] (describing pre-elec-
tion challenge to ballot measure involving dog racing ban); P.R. Lockhart, A Con-
troversial Florida Law Stops Some Former Felons from Voting. A Judge Just
Blocked Part of It, VOX (Oct. 19, 2019, 2:53 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-
politics/2019/7/2/20677955/amendment-4-florida-felon-voting-rights-lawsuits-
fines-fees [https://perma.unl.edu/WU63-RT5B] (explaining how a federal judge is-
sued a preliminary injunction blocking part of a law opponents described as a
“poll tax,” which was passed by the Florida legislature and contradicted Floridi-
ans’ voter-enacted ballot measure to restore felon voting rights).
37. See Howard Fischer, Arizona Supreme Court Throws ‘Invest in Ed’ Initiative off
Ballot, ARIZ. DAILY STAR (Aug. 29, 2018), https://tucson.com/news/local/arizona-
supreme-court-throws-invest-in-ed-initiative-off-ballot/article_ff493910-7797-
5ec7-b28a-d6c958a105fe.html [https://perma.unl.edu/UF2G-XXMH] (explaining
the court’s determination that the language of a ballot measure to increase edu-
cation funding “create[d] a significant danger of confusion or unfairness” (quoting
a statement by Chief Justice Scott Bales)); Howard Fischer, Judge Rules Clean




38. See Kurt Erickson, Judge Says Missouri Gas Tax Question Can Stay on Ballot,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/
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and Utah.39 Yet courts and scholars have given little attention to the
relationship between direct democracy and the judiciary.40 Accord-
ingly, the role of the courts and the approach courts take to judicial
review of ballot measures must be thoughtfully examined.
B. Judicial Review of Ballot Measures: Three Perspectives
There are three perspectives as to what level of judicial review
courts should use for reviewing challenges to ballot measures.
1. Perspective One: Ballot Measure Policies Reflect the Will of
the People, and Courts Should Therefore Be Highly
Deferential to Voters’ Choice
One perspective on the approach courts should take in reviewing
challenges to ballot measures is to be especially deferential to voters’
decisions because ballot measures directly reflect the will of voters.
Advocates of this approach argue that tools of direct democracy, like
ballot measures, achieve a more effective government for several rea-
sons.41 First, placing the power to create laws in the hands of the vot-
ers reduces corruption and the influence of special interests in the
govt-and-politics/judge-says-missouri-gas-tax-question-can-stay-on-ballot/arti-
cle_bf63e56a-5a89-5398-b485-d1cdd616f1ad.html [https://perma.unl.edu/4UPT-
PWUJ] (describing pre-election challenge to ballot measure increasing gas tax);
Allison Kite, Missouri Ethics Reform, Redistricting Initiative Tossed from Novem-
ber Ballot by Judge, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 14, 2018, 11:57 AM), https://
www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/election/article218396050.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/GH6S-DCVN] (describing pre-election challenge to ballot
measure containing proposals for redistricting and lowering campaign donation
limits); Tyler Wornell, Marijuana Initiative Organizer Sues to Get Other Two Re-
moved from Ballot, JOPLIN GLOBE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.joplinglobe.com/
news/local_news/marijuana-initiative-organizer-sues-to-get-other-two-removed-
from/article_18629bde-9f91-5f12-a581-b0e6b9dfadf4.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
97A6-HXJX] (describing pre-election challenge to two medical marijuana ballot
measures).
39. See Bryan Schott, Count My Vote Appeals to the Supreme Court Claiming Utah’s
Signature Removal Process for Initiatives is Unconstitutional, UTAHPOLICY.COM
(June 15, 2018), https://utahpolicy.com/index.php/features/today-at-utah-policy/
16963-count-my-vote-appeals-to-the-supreme-court-claiming-utah-s-signature-
removal-process-for-initiatives-is-unconstitutional [https://perma.unl.edu/9KKP-
KSXS] (describing challenge to Utah election law that allows petition signers to
remove their names after signatures are turned in to the state); Ben Winslow,
Opponents Sue to Block Medical Marijuana from Going on the November Ballot in
Utah, FOX 13 SALT LAKE CITY (May 18, 2018, 3:29 PM), https://fox13now.com/
2018/05/18/opponents-sue-to-block-medical-marijuana-from-going-on-the-novem-
ber-ballot/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7S5K-5T5Q] (describing pre-election challenge
to ballot measure legalizing medical marijuana).
40. Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748, 2749
(2005) [hereinafter Judicial Approaches].
41. Id. at 2754.
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legislative process.42 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, ballot
measures originated as a means for circumventing monied influence
in politics.43 In this way, ballot measures have an instrumental value:
curtailing the power and influence of special interest groups in order
to satisfy majoritarian policy preferences.44 They serve as a tool to
advance agendas that are not otherwise able to withstand the legisla-
tive process.45
Second, proponents of a voter-deferential approach are concerned
with the agency of voters and the ability of direct democracy to shape
a better-informed—and more politically engaged—citizenry.46 Ballot
measures can “increase popular participation in and responsibility for
government, provide a permanent instrument of civic education, and
give popular talk the reality and discipline that it needs to be effec-
tive.”47 Proponents of this approach view attempts by courts to inter-
fere and overturn voters’ decisions as examples of elitism and
42. Id. at 2754–55.
43. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 56. The authors explain that the early propo-
nents of ballot measures hoped to “allow citizens to enact measures to curb legal
privileges of wealth. Populists saw the initiative as a means to enact redistribu-
tive measures.” Id.
44. Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669,
1709 (2007). Mikos also argues that ballot measures safeguard federalism, as citi-
zens tend to favor local and state governments and seek to protect themselves
from federal encroachment. Id. at 1711–12.
45. K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the Federal Preemption Equation: A
Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2005).
46. Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at 2755. But see Sherman J. Clark, The
Character of Direct Democracy, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 341 (2004) (arguing
that ballot measures foster a community where the function of law and govern-
ment is to simply satisfy individual preferences and demands). Sherman writes:
[Ballot measures] encourage citizens to do one thing above all—an-
nounce their desires and preferences. Voting on an initiative or referen-
dum, a citizen is not required to do anything that might be difficult or
costly. There is no work involved, no service, and no sense of putting
oneself on the line. The citizen is invited to exercise power, but is not
required, or even encouraged, to come to terms with his or her agency in
the consequences. Nor are voters in this context encouraged to think in
terms of their connections with or potential obligations toward
others. . . . Far from ‘civic maturation,’ this is arguably the participation
of an infant, who has learned to say ‘I want,’ but little else.
Id. at 344. Sherman further compares ballot measures to military service, an-
other activity known for fostering civic responsibility. Id. at 355. However, Sher-
man argues that the civic engagement fostered by military service differs from
ballot measures in two key ways: (1) the military requires service and sacrifice,
with a focus on contributing to the community rather than satisfying individual
demands, and (2) military service demands accepting responsibility for one’s ac-
tions. Id. at 356–57.
47. Dyck & Lascher, supra note 19 (quoting BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOC-
RACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 284 (1984)).
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paternalism.48 The attempts also show a lack of trust in voters’ ability
to make reasonable decisions for themselves.49 When courts overturn
the majority’s will, voters can become cynical and disengaged from the
political process.50
Finally, and most importantly, advocates of a voter-deferential ap-
proach argue that ballot measures more accurately reflect the will of
the people and, therefore, better serve the public interest.51 Ballot
measures typically involve large numbers of voters, many of whom are
not ordinarily involved in political processes.52 Proponents argue that
when voters pass a ballot measure, the newly-passed law reflects the
will of the majority more effectively than a law passed through the
legislature.53 Ballot measures were designed specifically to address
the problems of stalled representative governments.54 Ultimately,
proponents argue, majority rule is a fundamental principle of democ-
racy, one that can improve the accuracy and efficiency of the
government.55
48. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503,
1584–85 (1990).
49. Id. For a discussion of an alternative approach demonstrating trust in voters’
decision-making, see Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of Deliberative Democ-
racy: A Proposal for a Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359 (2002) (proposing a
fourth branch of government, the “Popular Branch,” which would be a delibera-
tive assembly comprised of citizens). Leib proposes that within the Popular
Brach: “[O]rganizers in civil society could collect signatures to take action them-
selves. Political consultants would be hired, and experts would be consulted. A
bill . . . would be drafted without state intervention.” Id. at 404.
50. Eule, supra note 48, at 1585 (“Precisely because judicial actions regarding ballot
measures are highly visible, there is a substantial danger that these decisions
will engender popular cynicism . . . . [W]e run the risk that these majorities will
cease to see these issues as something they ought to care about.”).
51. Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at 2755.
52. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 57.
53. See id. at 58. Collins and Oesterle are critical of the conclusion that ballot mea-
sures more accurately reflect the majority will. They point to the influence of
money, the fact that voters tend to be more affluent and better-educated, and
that some measures are passed simply out of voter confusion. Id. Yet they ac-
knowledge “[i]t is natural to assume that direct is better, more nearly perfect,
than indirect—that the ideal of consent of the governed is better achieved by con-
senting to the laws themselves, rather than to representative lawmakers. This
argument from the logic of democracy surely has much to do with the initiative’s
popularity.” Id. at 55.
54. K.K. DuVivier, Fast-Food Government and Physician-Assisted Death: The Role of
Direct Democracy in Federalism, 86 OR. L. REV. 895, 912 (2007) (arguing that
ballot measures are a form of “fast-food government”: not ideal in the long-term
but the best option in certain situations, such as when people want to act when
the legislature is unresponsive for social or political reasons).
55. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 58–63. Some scholars, economists, and ballot
measure advocates argue that ballot measures make government more efficient
and reduce costs overall. Id. Collins and Oesterle state that it is difficult to fully
assess these claims. Id.
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2. Perspective Two: The Non-Legislative Origin of Ballot
Measure Policies Mandates a Heightened Level of
Judicial Scrutiny.
Some scholars argue that laws enacted through ballot measures
have several important flaws that mandate a heightened level of judi-
cial scrutiny. First, critics like legal scholar Julian Eule argue that the
Founding Fathers did not intend for the government to function as a
direct democracy; rather, the U.S. Constitution creates and guaran-
tees a republican form of government for states56 so that a representa-
tive group of elected officials can limit the threat of oppressive
majority and minority factions in the lawmaking process.57 In other
words, the gap between the will of the majority and the voice of the
legislature exists by constitutional design.58 In The Federalist No. 51,
James Madison voiced his distrust of majority factions, writing:
It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injus-
tice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes
of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure.59
Critics worry that ballot measures will serve as a vehicle for majority
factions to limit the rights of unpopular minorities.60 This worry is
based on historical and current reality; there are recent examples of
ballot measures that have targeted minority groups.61 It is within this
reality, critics argue, that courts should assume a larger role, “not be-
cause direct democracy is unconstitutional, nor because it frequently
produces legislation that we may find substantively displeasing . . .
but because the judiciary stands alone in guarding against the evils
56. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
57. Eule, supra note 48, at 1522–26; see also Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at
2757–58 (“[T]he processes of direct democracy are antithetical to the form of re-
publican government instituted by the Founders and guaranteed by the
Constitution.”).
58. Eule, supra note 48, at 1514.
59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 8 (James Madison).
60. See Samir Junejo, Comment, Majority Rule: How the Ballot Initiative Process
Hurts Minorities, 14 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 875 (2016); see also Todd Donovan,
Direct Democracy and Campaigns Against Minorities, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1730,
1743 (2013) (“The populist backlash . . . mean[s] that direct-democracy campaigns
over questions of minority rights are not simply about a particular right and a
particular minority group, but may also reflect a reaction to counter-majoritarian
aspects of democracy that are facilitated by courts and representative
government.”).
61. See, e.g., John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Call for Heightened
Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 154 (1993) (discussing Colorado’s
Amendment 2 ballot measure, where Colorado voters amended the Colorado con-
stitution to include a statement that prohibited existing ordinances and future
legislation that sought to end discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
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incident to transient, impassioned majorities that the Constitution
seeks to dissipate.”62
In fact, Nebraskans have used the ballot box as a means for ad-
vancing policies that target minority residents. In 2009, citizens of
Fremont, Nebraska circulated a petition proposing a city ordinance
that would make it illegal for any person or business in Fremont to
knowingly or recklessly rent property to an undocumented immigrant
unless expressly permitted by federal law.63 The ballot measure re-
quired prospective tenants to get an occupancy license from the
Fremont Police Department, who then had to contact the federal gov-
ernment to verify that the prospective tenant could legally reside in
the United States.64
The ballot measure responded to a growth in the number of Latino
residents in the town—a 190% increase between 2000 and 201065—
largely due to a local meatpacking plant that employed immigrant
workers.66 The Fremont voters initially approved the ordinance, but it
was put on hold while opponents mounted legal challenges, stating
that federal immigration law and the Fair Housing Act preempted the
ordinance.67 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity
of the city ordinance, and in February 2014, the city council held a
second referendum vote on the ordinance.68 Fremont residents voted
to keep the ordinance, effectively banning undocumented immigrants
from renting houses in the town.69 In November 2018, residents of
62. Eule, supra note 48, at 1525.
63. City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 721, 781 N.W.2d 456, 459 (2010).
64. Id. at 722, 781 N.W.2d at 459.
65. Nicholas Bergin, Fremont Set to Vote on Immigration Ordinance Tuesday, LIN-
COLN J. STAR (Feb. 9, 2014), https://journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/ne-
braska/fremont-set-to-vote-on-immigration-ordinance-tuesday/article_1ac49522-
9890-56a3-be7a-dc5e450c53c6.html [https://perma.unl.edu/DRU9-2KEJ].
66. Monica Davey, City in Nebraska Torn as Immigration Vote Nears, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/us/18nebraska.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/H77T-N9XX] (“If the population changes have shifted the
way Fremont feels, so has the coming anti-illegal-immigration referendum. His-
panic residents say they once felt welcomed here or, at least, not noticed but the
increasingly loud political fight, they say, seems to have changed the tone.”).
67. Bergin, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Nebraska City Votes to Keep Rule Aimed at Illegal Immi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/12/us/ne-
braska-city-votes-to-keep-rule-aimed-at-illegal-immigrants.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/2WYM-ZNQC]. But see David Hendee, Catch-22 Keeps Fremont
from Acting on Controversial Housing Ordinance, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Apr.
12, 2015), https://www.omaha.com/news/metro/catch—keeps-fremont-from-act-
ing-on-controversial-housing-ordinance/article_34091da3-ddd3-5643-8076-f474
fd328260.html [https://perma.unl.edu/MWB8-KWTT] (stating the ordinance was
“toothless” because the federal government could not provide city officials with
renters’ immigration status).
2020] EXECUTION ON THE BALLOT 267
Scribner, Nebraska approved a nearly identical ordinance for their
town.70
Proponents of a heightened level of judicial review also argue that
ballot measures do not actually reflect the will of the majority.71 First,
less than half of the voting-eligible population in the U.S. votes in
elections; for example, the 2018 midterm election saw a fifty-year re-
cord high voter turnout, yet only forty-seven percent of the eligible
population actually voted.72 Further, voters of color73 and low-income
voters74 vote at a substantially lower rate than white voters, meaning
votes that are cast disproportionately reflect the will of white, upper-
and middle-class voters. This disparity in voter turnout can be
traced to a variety of factors, including lack of transportation,75 long-
er wait lines at polls in communities of color,76 voter ID laws,77 “ex-
70. Paul Hammel, Scribner Voters Approve Ordinance Barring Illegal Immigrants




71. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 58. For a related discussion on political pro-
cess theory, minority rights, and ballot measures, see Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the
Alter: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the Marriage Debate, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2011).
72. Camila Domonoske, A Boatload of Ballots: Midterm Voter Turnout Hit 50-Year
High, NPR (Nov. 8, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/08/665197690/
a-boatload-of-ballots-midterm-voter-turnout-hit-50-year-high [https://
perma.unl.edu/BLS6-34HQ].
73. Bernard L. Fraga, The Turnout Gap Between Whites and Racial Minorities Is
Larger than You Think — and Hard to Change, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018, 4:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/25/the-
turnout-gap-between-whites-and-racial-minorities-is-larger-than-you-think-and-
hard-to-change/ [https://perma.unl.edu/94NU-T433]. Only 36.7% of eligible voters
voted in 2014, and 41% voted in 2010. Id. In 2014, 54% of white Americans re-
ported voting, compared to just 49% of African Americans, 33% of Latinos, and
35% of Asian Americans. Id.
74. Daniel Weeks, Why Are the Poor and Minorities Less Likely to Vote?, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 10, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/01/why-are-
the-poor-and-minorities-less-likely-to-vote/282896/ [https://perma.unl.edu/ZQ92-
7V8E]. According to the U.S. Census, only 47% of eligible voters with annual
earnings of less than $20,000 voted in the 2012 election. Id. In contrast, 80% of
eligible voters with incomes of $100,000 a year or greater voted that year. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Vann R. Newkirk II, Voter Suppression Is Warping Democracy, ATLANTIC (July
17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/07/poll-prri-voter-
suppression/565355/ [https://perma.unl.edu/UDQ2-RUFY].
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act match” systems,78 and issues with receiving requested absentee
ballots.79
Additionally, other proponents of this approach express concerns
that the high cost of successful ballot initiatives means that outside,
special interest groups play a major role in influencing ballot mea-
sures. There is an emerging ballot measure industry, equipped with
professional signature gatherers, marketing firms, and substantial re-
sources, that can be deployed by special interest groups in local ballot
measure campaigns.80 In the 2018 election, it was estimated that pro-
ponents and opponents spent more than $1 billion on 150 ballot mea-
sures across the nation.81 In fact, ballot measure campaigns often cost
more than campaigns for political office.82 Researchers who have stud-
ied ballot measure campaign financing conclude that the influence of
money is at least as great in ballot measures as it is on the legislative
process.83
Finally, a major concern about laws enacted through ballot mea-
sures is that the public is not qualified, or at least not the best suited,
to make informed decisions about complex policy issues.84 Some ballot
78. Terry Gross, Republican Voter Suppression Efforts Are Targeting Minorities,
Journalist Says, NPR: FRESH AIR (Oct. 23, 2018, 2:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/10/23/659784277/republican-voter-suppression-efforts-are-targeting-minor-
ities-journalist-says [https://perma.unl.edu/Q448-HUC5] (noting that “exact
match” systems, where the name on a voter roll must be identical to the name in
the state system for the vote to count, is “disenfranchisement by typo”).
79. Weeks, supra note 74.
80. Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at 2757; see also Miriam Pawel, California
Ballot Initiatives Are Powerful. The Powerful Have Noticed., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/opinion/california-ballot-initiatives-
direct-democracy.html [https://perma.unl.edu/H6KW-XW5V] (explaining the ini-
tiative-industrial complex that has emerged in California as special interest
groups pour money and resources into ballot measures).
81. Reid Wilson, Corporations, Interest Groups Spend Fortunes on Ballot Measures,
HILL (Sept. 1, 2018, 4:16 PM), https://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/404555-cor
porations-interest-groups-spend-fortunes-on-ballot-measures [https://perma.unl
.edu/QC89-B8AN] (noting that in California, housing advocates and homeowners
spent $41 million fighting a ballot measure that would allow cities to implement
rent control; in Florida, the Disney Corporation and Seminole Tribe spent $27
million in support of a measure to limit the number of casinos in the state; bil-
lionaire hedge fund manager Tom Steyer spent $8 million on an Arizona measure
to require electric companies to rely on renewable energy; and even a fight over
rules for hard rock mining in Montana cost almost $2 million).
82. Cody Hoesly, Comment, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1191, 1203–04 (2005) (explaining that in every election between
1996 and 2000, Oregonians and outside interest groups spent more money on
ballot measures in the state than on all of the candidate campaigns for state of-
fice combined).
83. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 92–93.
84. See id. at 91–92. (“An initiative’s subject can be technical, not apparent to citizens
without special knowledge. There can be so many initiatives and candidates that
voters’ capacity to understand them is overwhelmed. And, as in all political cam-
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measures are so complicated that it is unlikely many voters will fully
understand what they are voting on.85 Ballot measure propositions
tend to be “lengthy, complex, technical, carelessly phrased, and ambig-
uous,” and if voters are ignorant or mistaken, it is less certain that the
prevailing position actually reflects the majority’s opinion on the is-
sue.86 Additionally, proponents and opponents of ballot measures may
unintentionally or deliberately confuse voters through tactics such as
deceptive advertising, confusing the voter about the significance of a
“yes” or “no” vote, and placing competing propositions on the ballot.87
Because ballot measures offer voters only binary choices, voters
are also restricted to black-and-white options without the ability to
select more nuanced alternatives.88 Julian Eule explains, “Isolated de-
cisions [like ballot measures] create few opportunities for trade-offs
and little need for the establishment of continuing relationships.”89 In
contrast, Eule notes, representative legislative bodies engender coop-
paigns, there can be misleading claims made for or against a measure, particu-
larly in advertisements.”).
85. Eule, supra note 48, at 1516. For examples of complicated ballot measures, see
Suevon Lee, Five of the Most Confusing Ballots in the Country, PROPUBLICA (Nov.
5, 2012, 10:58 PM), https://www.propublica.org/article/five-of-the-most-confusing-
ballots-in-the-country [https://perma.unl.edu/6Z56-LXMW].
86. Eule, supra note 48, at 1516.
87. Id. at 1517–18. To see an example of a deceptive ballot measure, see John
Schwartz, Measure in Florida That Claims to Back Solar Power May Discourage
It, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/science/flor-
ida-solar-power-referendum.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TB9S-ESAV] (explain-
ing how the measure purported to “promote[ ] solar in the Sunshine State,” yet
actually allowed utility companies to raise fees on solar customers).
88. Eule, supra note 48, at 1520–21; see also Alan Greenblatt, Lawmakers Eye
Changes to Ballot Measures—Passed and Future, GOVERNING (Jan. 16, 2019),
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-lawmakers-block-ballot-mea-
sures.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6G9V-TFHH] (“Ballot measures are a blunt in-
strument––requiring a binary yes-or-no response—and aren’t forced to jostle for
funds against other proposals the way ordinary legislation does.”).
89. Eule, supra note 48, at 1527; see also Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of
Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 482 (1998) (arguing for a need to evalu-
ate processes that claim to reflect popular will, particularly asking whether the
process reflects both preferences and priorities). Clark explains:
If our goal were to measure issue-by-issue majority preference, more di-
rect would indeed be more responsive, and the mediating devices of rep-
resentative government would indeed be agency costs, noise, or
interference. Recall, however, that in populist terms the goal is to hear
the voice of the people as well and as fully as possible. Political processes
respond to the legitimacy problem by ensuring that voters have as full
an opportunity as possible to influence the rules (plural) under which
they must live. For those whose aim is to give the people a voice in gov-
ernment, therefore, the goal of political processes should not be to permit
each voter to describe, one issue at a time, his or her perfect world, as if
describing what he or she would do if elected Czar. Rather, the goal
should be to allow each person, who knows that his or her perfect world
will not be enacted––who knows that he or she will win some and lose
some––to speak most clearly about the world as a whole by telling us
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eration, with shifting alliances, new issues, and winners and losers
who “return to meet again.”90 Some scholars have suggested remedies
for this concern, including encouraging states to adopt mandatory pe-
riods of deliberation for proposed measures.91
3. Perspective Three: Courts Should Examine Ballot Measures
with the Same Level of Scrutiny Used for Comparable
Policies Passed Through the Legislature.
Often, courts disregard the manner in which a law is passed, and
they approach legislation enacted through ballot measures the same
way they approach legislation enacted through a legislature.92 Propo-
nents of this approach argue that adopting different standards of re-
view for laws passed through ballot measures versus legislatures rests
erroneously on procedural concerns.93 They argue that the legislative
process does not substantially differ from the ballot measure process
in the way laws are created; specifically, the legislative process is not
necessarily any more deliberative than the ballot measure process.94
In fact, because legislators must answer to their constituents and
are concerned with re-election, legislators are prone to use the same
oversimplifications and distortions of facts as ballot measures (assum-
ing ballot measures use such tactics).95 While the lack of deliberation
what he or she most wants to win and what he or she is most willing to
lose.
Id. at 448.
90. Eule, supra note 48, at 1527.
91. Collins & Oesterle, supra note 4, at 112. Collins and Oesterle note that in order
for a deliberation period to be useful, it should include reasonable procedures for
reviewing drafts, public notice and hearing, consultation among proponents and
opponents, consultation with public officials, and opportunities to amend or with-
draw proposals in favor of legislative substitutes. Id.
92. Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at 2751; see also Collins & Oesterle, supra
note 4, at 110–11 (arguing that courts should treat laws passed through ballot
measures the same as those enacted by the legislature).
93. Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct
Legislation, 1 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1997); see also Raquel Frisardi,
Note, Missouri’s Health Care Battle and Differential Judicial Review of Popular
Lawmaking, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 207, 209 (2011) (“[T]he proper way to balance
the ideological weight of popular lawmaking with its non-constitutional status is
to view popular legislation through the same lens as its traditionally enacted
counterpart.”).
94. Tushnet, supra note 93, at 7; see also Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal
Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527, 531 (1994)
(arguing that the perceived problem with judicial review of ballot measures does
not arise out of inherent differences between legislative and popular lawmaking,
but instead, arises from “what some view as cramped judicial interpretation of
specific constitutional guarantees, particularly an overly restrained equal protec-
tion analysis”).
95. Tushnet, supra note 93, at 8 (“The simplifications and distortions associated with
the direct legislation campaigns will surely be deployed in legislative election and
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in passing laws through ballot measures is frequently given as a rea-
son for needing heightened judicial scrutiny of such laws, legal scholar
Mark Tushnet argues that the type of detached deliberation critics
discuss is often reserved for those in positions of social power, which
“reinforce[s] hierarchies of power that direct legislation is partly de-
signed to overcome.”96 Ultimately, Tushnet posits, those who argue
for a difference in judicial review have a “fear of voting,” where “the
people . . . are not as good as they ought to be.”97
There are drawbacks, however, to using the same approach for bal-
lot measures. First, some interpretative canons rely on lawmakers’ ex-
pertise and familiarity with the practice and consequences of
legislation, factors that are not at play in voter-led ballot measures.98
For example, courts often ascribe meaning to terms in a statute based
on the legislature’s use of the term in other contexts or by reviewing a
statute’s legislative history, including previous versions of a statute,
committee hearings, and floor debates.99 Additionally, courts often
look to legislative intent when interpreting a law enacted through the
legislature.100 When courts apply a similar “intentionalist approach”
to laws popularly enacted through ballot measures, challenges arise,
such as (1) difficulty in determining an aggregate voter intent from
thousands of individual voters, (2) lack of voter knowledge about the
legal context surrounding a ballot measure issue, and (3) the ballot
measure’s use of technical language or legal jargon that obscures vot-
ers’ true intent.101
C. Nebraska’s Repeal & Reinstatement of the Death Penalty:
A Case Study
1. Background
In May 2015, Nebraska received national attention when its con-
servative legislature voted to repeal the death penalty, overriding
Governor Pete Ricketts’s veto in a vote that crossed party lines.102 At
that time, Nebraska became the nineteenth state in the United States
re-election campaigns. Anticipating this, a legislator would be unwilling to take a
fully deliberated position on the matter.”).
96. Id. at 10–11.
97. Id. at 19.
98. Judicial Approaches, supra note 40, at 2752.
99. Id. at 2752–53.
100. Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Di-
rect Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110 (1995).
101. See id.
102. Julie Bosman, Nebraska Bans Death Penalty, Defying a Veto, N.Y. TIMES (May
27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/28/us/nebraska-abolishes-death-
penalty.html [https://perma.unl.edu/W7XB-HZRH].
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to end capital punishment103 and the first conservative state to do so
since 1973.104 Before the historic vote, Nebraska state senators had
unsuccessfully introduced a bill to repeal the death penalty every year
since 1981.105 However, in 2015, the effort to repeal capital punish-
ment had bi-partisan support, with both liberal and conservative
lawmakers pointing to the waste and expense of executions,106 relig-
ious and moral values,107 cases of wrongful convictions,108 and Ne-
braska’s difficulty in obtaining lethal injection drugs.109 Governor
Ricketts fought against the repeal bill and strongly denounced its pas-
sage after the override vote stating that “the Legislature ha[d] lost
touch with the citizens of Nebraska.”110
In response to the repeal of the death penalty, proponents of capi-
tal punishment launched a ballot measure campaign—specifically, a
referendum111—to repeal the legislature’s vote and reinstate the
death penalty in Nebraska.112 Governor Ricketts helped “initiate, or-
ganize, and fund Nebraskans for the Death Penalty”—the organiza-
tion in charge of the ballot measure campaign.113 Governor Ricketts
103. David Bailey & Fiona Ortiz, Nebraska Legislature Repeals Death Penalty, Over-




104. Mark Berman, Nebraska Lawmakers Abolish the Death Penalty, Narrowly Over-
riding Governor’s Veto, WASH. POST (May 27, 2015, 5:50 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/05/27/nebraska-lawmakers-
officially-abolish-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.unl.edu/97P9-3WFX].
105. Jessica Glenza, Nebraska Legislature Narrowly Votes to Repeal Death Penalty,
GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
may/27/nebraska-legislature-repeal-death-penalty [https://perma.unl.edu/H9TK-
DH3E].
106. Bosman, supra note 102.
107. Id.
108. Berman, supra note 104.
109. Bailey & Ortiz, supra note 103.
110. Bosman, supra note 102.
111. A referendum petition is a type of ballot measure used to repeal a law recently
passed by the Legislature. See HOW TO USE THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PRO-
CESS IN NEBRASKA, supra note 10.
112. JoAnne Young, Group Will Seek Signatures to Put Death Penalty on the Ballot,
LINCOLN J. STAR (June 1, 2015), https://journalstar.com/legislature/group-will-
seek-signatures-to-put-death-penalty-on-the/article_ef2b4e5b-200d-52c9-8e46-
489039c7ecc8.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TF3A-XUCQ].
113. Sylvia Krohn, Death Penalty Law Remains Unsettled in Nebraska, A.B.A. (May
10, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/committees/death_penalty_repre-
sentation/project_press/2019/spring/death-penalty-law-remains-unsettled-in-ne-
braska/ [https://perma.unl.edu/7TA6-KYWN]. In addition to his role supporting
Nebraskans for the Death Penalty, Governor Ricketts garnered attention for his
failed attempt to import lethal injection drugs from India, a response to critics’
argument that the necessary lethal injection drugs were not readily available to
carry out executions in the first place. See Garrett Epps, Out of Spite: The Gover-
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and his family donated $425,000 of the $1.3 million spent on the ballot
referendum.114 Of that total, $300,000 was from Governor Ricketts
directly.115
The campaign successfully collected nearly three times the number
of signatures needed to put the issue on the ballot, with over 166,000
signatures collected from Nebraskans across the state.116 Ultimately,
there were enough signatures to postpone the repeal of the death pen-
alty until after voters had a chance to vote on the ballot referendum in
the election.117
2. Hargesheimer v. Gale: The Pre-Election Challenge
In Hargesheimer v. Gale, the Hargesheimers, opponents of the bal-
lot referendum to re-instate the death penalty in Nebraska, sought
pre-election review of the referendum on procedural grounds.118 The
Hargesheimers argued that the referendum petition failed to comply
with chapter 32, section 1405(1) of the Nebraska Revised Statutes,119
which requires a sworn statement containing the names of all petition
sponsors to be filed with the Secretary of State’s office prior to signa-
ture collection.120 In particular, the Hargesheimers argued that Gov-
ernor Pete Ricketts was a sponsor of the petition because of his
substantial financial contributions to and management of the cam-
nor of Nebraska’s Threat to Execute Prisoners, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2015), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/a-governor-threatens-to-execute-
prisoners-out-of-spite/394949/#Correction [https://perma.unl.edu/Y6K8-9LZA].
114. Paul Hammel, Nebraskans Vote Overwhelmingly to Restore Death Penalty, Nul-





116. Paul Hammel, Death Penalty Backers Turn in 166,692 Signatures––Far More




117. Paul Hammel, Death Penalty Supporters Put Repeal on Hold Till 2016 Vote,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Oct. 16, 2015), https://www.omaha.com/news/nebraska/
death-penalty-supporters-put-repeal-on-hold-till-vote/article_d713527e-6f20-
5903-8654-cc5d283ba47a.html [https://perma.unl.edu/E9AX-VE44].
118. Hargesheimer v. Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 125–26, 881 N.W.2d 589, 592–93 (2016).
119. Id.
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1405(1) (Reissue 2016) (“Prior to obtaining any signatures
on an initiative or referendum petition, a statement of the object of the petition
and the text of the measure shall be filed with the Secretary of State together
with a sworn statement containing the names and street addresses of every per-
son, corporation, or association sponsoring the petition.”). Broadly speaking, a
petition is a list of several people signing their names on a paper to express their
opinion. HOW TO USE THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM PROCESS IN NEBRASKA,
supra note 10.
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paign, and that failure to include his name on the list of sponsors vio-
lated section 32-1405(1).121 The Hargesheimers sought: (1) an
injunction enjoining the Secretary of State from placing the referen-
dum on the ballot, and (2) a declaratory judgment that the failure to
list one of the sponsors on the petition’s sworn statement constituted a
material and fatal omission that made the petition invalid as a matter
of law.122
In its analysis, the Nebraska Supreme Court feared that the
Hargesheimers’ suggestion of interpreting “sponsoring the petition”
under section 32-1405(1) to mean parties who heavily participate in
the petition process would restrict ballot initiative and referendum
powers.123 The court explained:
We have stated that the power of initiative must be liberally construed to pro-
mote the democratic process, that the right of initiative is precious to the peo-
ple and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable
measure of spirit as well as letter, and that the provisions authorizing the
initiative should be construed in such a manner that the legislative power
reserved in the people is effectual.124
In acknowledging that the right to ballot measures is “precious to the
people,” the court narrowly defined “sponsoring the petition” under
section 32-1405(1) as “assuming responsibility for the initiative or ref-
erendum petition process.”125 The court upheld the district court’s dis-
missal of the Hargesheimers’ complaint and the issue proceeded to the
ballot.126
3. The Election and Aftermath: Ballot Confusion, Subsequent
Legal Challenges, and an Execution
After the court in Hargesheimer determined that the ballot
measure was sufficient on procedural grounds, Nebraskans voted
overwhelmingly in the 2016 general election to nullify the legislature’s
decision and reinstate the death penalty.127 Prior to the elec-
tion, however, there was concern that the language chosen for
the ballot—the language that voters would read when casting
their votes in November—was confusing and misleading.128 State
121. Hargesheimer, 294 Neb. at 126, 881 N.W.2d at 593.
122. Id. at 127, 881 N.W.2d at 593.
123. Id. at 134, 881 N.W.2d at 597–98.
124. Id. at 134, 881 N.W.2d at 597 (emphasis added) (citing Stewart v. Advanced
Gaming Techs., Inc., 272 Neb. 471, 485–86, 723 N.W.2d 65, 77 (2006)).
125. Id. at 131, 881 N.W.2d at 596 (adopting a definition first used by Chief Justice
Hendry in his concurrence in Loontjer v. Robinson, 266 Neb. 902, 911, 670
N.W.2d 301, 308 (2003)).
126. Id. at 137, 881 N.W.2d at 599.
127. Hammel, supra note 114.
128. See Christopher Burbach, Read It Carefully: Ballot Language for Death Penalty
Referendum Is Correct, but Confusing, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.omaha.com/news/politics/read-it-carefully-ballot-language-for-death
2020] EXECUTION ON THE BALLOT 275
law129 mandated that voters be asked whether to “retain” or “repeal”
Legislative Bill 268130—the bill passed by the legislature to eliminate
the death penalty.131 The result was a double negative:132 a vote to
“retain” would get rid of the death penalty; a vote to “repeal” would
keep the death penalty.133 Nebraskans on both sides of the issue ex-
pressed concern about the confusing language.134 Experience shows
that voters tend to vote “no” on a ballot referendum when there is con-
fusion, which may have benefitted the “repeal” side who wanted to
keep the death penalty.135 Ultimately, 60% of Nebraskans voted to
keep the death penalty.136
On December 4, 2017, one year after the election, the American
Civil Liberties Union of Nebraska (ACLU) filed a complaint seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for eleven inmates on death row.137
-penalty-referendum-is/article_4bfcf695-94a2-55d0-ac2d-7ecc935b9d50.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/GXY5-44GZ] (“If voters aren’t careful, they easily could
become confused and vote the opposite of their desires on the death penalty ballot
issue that Nebraskans are being asked to consider this fall.”).
129. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1410(2) (Reissue 2016) (“The Attorney General also shall
prepare a statement to be printed in italics immediately preceding the ballot title
on the official ballot. Such statement shall in clear and concise language explain
the effect of a vote to retain and a vote to repeal the measure in such language
that the statement will not be intentionally an argument or likely to create
prejudice, either for retention or for repeal of the measure. The ballot title shall
be so worded that those in favor of retaining the measure shall vote Retain and
those opposing the measure shall vote Repeal.”).
130. Leg. 268, 104th Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2015).
131. Burbach, supra note 128.
132. Josh Sanburn, The Future of the Death Penalty Will Be Decided in These 3 States,
TIME (Nov. 7, 2016, 5:34 PM), https://time.com/4561649/death-penalty-referen-
dum-california-nebraska/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5JKP-C22W] (“In Nebraska, the
state’s death-penalty wording is already leading to confusion because it’s essen-
tially written as a double negative.”).
133. Read the Death Penalty Referendum That Will Appear on the Nov. 8 Ballot,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Sept. 17, 2016) [hereinafter Read the Death Penalty Ref-
erendum], https://www.omaha.com/read-the-death-penalty-referendum-that-will-
appear-on-the/pdf_54cdffb2-7d3e-11e6-80a1-1fa8ab844954.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/2SZV-UFBY] (“A vote to ‘Retain’ will eliminate the death penalty
and change the maximum penalty for the crime of murder in the first degree to
life imprisonment by retaining Legislative Bill 268 . . . . A vote to ‘Repeal’ will
keep the death penalty as a possible penalty for the crime of murder in the first
degree by repealing Legislative Bill 268 . . . .”).
134. Sanburn, supra note 132.
135. Id.; see also Eule, supra note 48, at 1519 (suggesting that it is “conventional wis-
dom” that confused voters tend to vote “no”).
136. See NEB. SEC’Y OF STATE, REVISED OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF STATE CAN-
VASSERS: GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 8, 2016 (2016), https://sos.nebraska.gov/
sites/sos.nebraska.gov/files/doc/elections/2016/2016-canvass-book.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/C5JR-7K9Q].
137. Sandoval v. Ricketts, 302 Neb. 138, 140, 922 N.W.2d 222, 224 (2019); see also
Josh Saul, Don’t Kill Us: Death Row Inmates Sue Nebraska Governor, Claiming
He Illegally Funded Push to Execute Them, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 4, 2017, 2:39 PM),
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Like the plaintiffs in Hargesheimer, the ACLU challenged Governor
Ricketts’s involvement in the referendum, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the ballot referendum was not legally sufficient.138 Instead
of arguing that the campaign violated a statutory procedure by failing
to list Governor Ricketts as a sponsor like the plaintiffs in
Hargesheimer, the ACLU argued that the Governor’s involvement was
altogether unconstitutional.139 Specifically, the ACLU maintained
that Governor Ricketts and the executive branch “proposed, initiated,
financed, organized, managed, and directed the process” in violation of
the separation of powers provision of the Nebraska constitution, ren-
dering the referendum legally insufficient.140
In addition, the ACLU argued that the inmates’ death sentences
were converted to life sentences when the death penalty repeal passed
in the Nebraska legislature,141 and the announcement that the cam-
paign had collected enough signatures to suspend the operation of
Legislative Bill 268 did not reinstate the death penalty for those
whose sentences had been converted to life sentences.142 Instead, the
ACLU argued, Nebraskans’ vote to restore capital punishment only
applies to future first-degree murders.143 The court affirmed the dis-
https://www.newsweek.com/death-row-inmates-sue-nebraska-governor-730534
[https://perma.unl.edu/B86L-HBS6] (noting that all of Nebraska’s death row in-
mates filed a lawsuit “in an attempt to save their lives”).
138. Sandoval, 302 Neb. at 140, 922 N.W.2d at 224.
139. Id.
140. Id.; see also JoAnne Young, ACLU Files Lawsuit on Behalf of Death Row Inmates
Against Ricketts, Corrections Department, LINCOLN J. STAR (Dec. 4, 2017), https://
journalstar.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/aclu-files-lawsuit-on-
behalf-of-death-row-inmates-against/article_799fb7e2-ef88-5381-863b-07ec052a
3b8a.html [https://perma.unl.edu/FS7R-QTBN] (“In Nebraska, our state Consti-
tution . . . establishes a strong tradition with a clear separation of powers. The
governor can’t have it both ways and serve both as a member of the executive and
legislative branches.” (quoting Danielle Conrad, Executive Director of the ACLU
of Nebraska)).
141. Sandoval, 302 Neb. at 141, 922 N.W.2d at 224; see also Paul Hammel, ACLU of
Nebraska Sues to Block Executions, Says Ricketts Overstepped in Referendum
Process, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.omaha.com/news/ne-
braska/aclu-of-nebraska-sues-to-block-executions-says-ricketts-overstepped/arti-
cle_f246b9e6-772a-5f8e-8d57-a5eadbdda5f3.html [https://perma.unl.edu/T5PH-
48Q8] (“The ACLU of Nebraska charged that the death penalty repeal, enacted
by the State Legislature over a veto by Gov. Pete Ricketts, was in effect long
enough to convert the death sentences for the 11 men to life in prison.”); Paul
Hammel, Nebraska’s Death Penalty Repeal Was Temporary but It Changed In-
mates’ Sentences, ACLU Argues, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Dec. 6, 2018), https://
www.omaha.com/news/courts/nebraska-s-death-penalty-repeal-was-temporary-
but-it-changed/article_3f218d89-3627-503d-8694-ea4ff287ac5c.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/WK45-ASLM] (“Because a repeal was in effect, [the inmates] no
longer face the death penalty.” (quoting Brain Stull, an attorney for the ACLU)).
142. Sandoval, 302 Neb. at 141, 922 N.W.2d at 224.
143. Hammel, ACLU of Nebraska Sues to Block Executions, Says Ricketts Overstepped
in Referendum Process, supra note 141.
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missal of the ACLU’s claims on the ground that the inmates have
other equally serviceable remedies and did not address the constitu-
tional separation of powers or sentence conversion issues.144 In Au-
gust 2018, before the Sandoval decision, Nebraska executed Carey
Dean Moore.145 It was the first execution in the state in twenty-one
years.146
III. ANALYSIS
A. Lessons from Nebraska: Adopting a Rule of Pre-Election
Deference and Post-Election Legislative Mirroring
The Nebraska Supreme Court repeatedly articulates that its ap-
proach to pre-election review is highly deferential to voters. The court
summarized this perspective in the pre-election death penalty referen-
dum challenge in Hargesheimer when it stated, “the power of initia-
tive must be liberally construed to promote the democratic process [as]
the right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the
144. Sandoval, 302 Neb. at 144, 922 N.W.2d at 226. The issue of whether death row
inmates’ sentences were converted to life sentences when LB 268 passed was
raised again in the case of death row inmate Nikko Jenkins, represented by the
national ACLU. See State v. Jenkins, 303 Neb. 676, 931 N.W.2d 851 (2019). The
court rejected the argument, adopting the rule that “upon the filing of a referen-
dum petition appearing to have a sufficient number of signatures, operation of
the legislative act is suspended so long as the verification and certification pro-
cess ultimately determines that the petition had the required number of valid
signatures.” Id. at 710, 931 N.W.2d at 879.
145. See Joe Duggan et al., ‘A Monumental Day’: Nebraska Executes Carey Dean Moore




146. Id. Nebraska also became the first state to use fentanyl in an execution as part of
a four-drug cocktail that had never been tested before. See Mitch Smith, Fentanyl
Used to Execute Nebraska Inmate, in a First for U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/us/carey-dean-moore-nebraska-execution-
fentanyl.html [https://perma.unl.edu/UK7M-BEQA]. Several days before the
planned execution, the pharmaceutical company that manufactured two of the
drugs in the cocktail unsuccessfully attempted to prevent Nebraska from using
the drugs for lethal injection, claiming that the drugs were obtained improperly.
Mark Berman, Nebraska Cleared to Carry Out County’s First Fentanyl Execution,
Judge Says, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2018, 5:41 PM), https://beta.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/08/10/nebraska-cleared-to-carry-out-countrys-
first-fentanyl-execution-judge-says/ [https://perma.unl.edu/Z9T6-YBPJ]. Addi-
tionally, concerns arose about the transparency of the execution as curtains were
closed to reporters when the lethal injection IV lines were set and for a fourteen-
minute span when Moore was declared dead. Joe Duggan, Transparency Con-
cerns Surface After Nebraska’s First Lethal Injection Execution, OMAHA WORLD-
HERALD (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.omaha.com/news/crime/transparency-con-
cerns-surface-after-nebraska-s-first-lethal-injection-execution/article_b3f73933-
c076-5a84-9a55-2c876df8b3fe.html [https://perma.unl.edu/R9WE-WQYY].
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courts are zealous to preserve.”147 Further, the court noted that the
constitutional right to ballot measures should not be circumscribed by
restrictive legislation or narrow and strict interpretation of the re-
lated statutes.148
The reasons for this pre-election deference are twofold. First,
courts can only review issues that are justiciable.149 The Nebraska
Supreme Court has held that “[a] justiciable issue requires a present,
substantial controversy between parties with adverse legal interests
that is susceptible to immediate resolution and capable of present ju-
dicial enforcement.”150 For this reason, Nebraska courts can only re-
view procedural, and not substantive, challenges to ballot measures
prior to an election.151 An opinion on substantive issues prior to an
election would be merely advisory.152
Second, there are practical reasons for the pre-election deference.
There are already relatively high procedural barriers to getting an is-
sue on the ballot in Nebraska.153 Additionally, many voters feel in-
vested in ballot measure campaigns, as they participate by signing
petitions, volunteering to collect petition signatures, writing opinion
letters in local newspapers, and meaningfully engaging in conversa-
tions about the ballot measure issue in their communities. When
courts make every attempt to ensure issues actually make it to the
ballot, it strengthens the public’s faith in government and the political
process.154
After the election, when voters have enacted or repealed a law, the
role of the courts can and should change from the extreme deference
used before an election. Nebraska’s experience with the death penalty
referendum illustrates several concerns critics like Julian Eule point
to in their defense of a more intense judicial review of ballot measures.
First, the population involved is a very unpopular minority: most nar-
rowly, the ballot measure impacts those convicted of first-degree mur-
147. Hargesheimer v. Gale, 294 Neb. 123, 134, 881 N.W.2d 589, 597 (2016).
148. Id.
149. City of Fremont v. Kotas, 279 Neb. 720, 726, 781 N.W.2d 456, 462 (2010) (“We
have long held that the existence of a justiciable issue is a fundamental require-
ment to a court’s exercise of its discretion to grant declaratory relief.”), abrogated
on other grounds by City of N. Platte v. Tilgner, 282 Neb. 328, 803 N.W.2d 469
(2011).
150. Id. at 727, 781 N.W.2d at 462 (citing Ellis v. Cty. of Scotts Bluff, 210 Neb. 495,
315 N.W.2d 451(1982)).
151. Id. at 725, 781 N.W.2d at 461 (“Substantive challenges to proposed initiatives are
not justiciable before the measure is adopted by voters.”).
152. Christensen v. Gale, 301 Neb. 19, 35, 917 N.W.2d 145, 158 (2018).
153. See NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2 (describing the procedures for ballot initiatives); Id.
art. III, § 3 (describing the procedures for ballot referendums).
154. See Eule, supra note 48, at 1585–86.
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der. Further, in Nebraska, like most states,155 felons cannot vote
while incarcerated, so arguably the minority most impacted by the
measure is not voting on the issue. More broadly, the measure affects
those who interact with the criminal justice system who are dispropor-
tionately people of color and low income.156 As discussed in subsection
II.B.2, those populations are also less likely to vote because of a vari-
ety of systemic and personal factors.157
Second, the confusing language on the ballot (voting “retain” to end
the death penalty and “repeal” to keep it) may have confused and mis-
led voters. This highlights the dangers of voters who are ignorant, ill-
informed, or simply confused, as discussed in subsection II.B.2.158 It is
difficult to determine whether a majority vote on a measure is truly
the will of the people when it is not clear that “the people” knew what
they were voting for. Additionally, the ballot contained only two dis-
tinct options: voters were either for the death penalty or against it.159
However, polling of Nebraskans prior to the election showed that
58.8% of Nebraskans favored alternatives to the death penalty, while
only 30% of those surveyed supported the death penalty above other
alternatives.160 The binary nature of ballot measures did not leave
much room for nuance, such as discussion of alternatives, in voters’
decision to repeal Legislative Bill 268.
Finally, Governor Ricketts’s personal involvement in funding over
one-third of the campaign highlights the danger of special interests
155. Jane C. Timm, Most States Disenfranchise Felons. Maine and Vermont Allow In-
mates to Vote from Prison, NBC NEWS (Feb. 26, 2018, 3:43 AM), https://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/states-rethink-prisoner-voting-rights-in-
carceration-rates-rise-n850406 [https://perma.unl.edu/XC5M-7UNV].
156. See SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018), https://
www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/4AXR-Y2K6]. The report findings include that African Americans
are 5.9 times as likely to be arrested as white Americans, and Latinos are 3.1
times as likely. Id. at 1. The introduction to the report states, “The wealthy can
access a vigorous adversary system replete with constitutional protections for de-
fendants. Yet the experiences of poor and minority defendants within the crimi-
nal justice system often differ substantially from that model . . . .” Id.
157. See supra notes 71–79 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
159. See Read the Death Penalty Referendum, supra note 133.
160. New Poll: Majority of Nebraska Voters Support Alternatives to the Death Penalty,
ACLU (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/press-releases/new-poll-majority-ne-
braska-voters-support-alternatives-death-penalty [https://perma.unl.edu/B34A-
M5XT]; PRISM SURVEYS, SURVEY ON THE DEATH PENALTY (2015), https://www.aclu
nebraska.org/sites/default/files/field_documents/Necappu01_Report_Memo_1.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/JJS7-6X5G]. Life without the possibility of parole is a
commonly-discussed alternative to the death penalty. See Opinion, Discussing
Death Penalty Alternatives, NEB. CITY NEWS-PRESS (Aug. 28, 2018, 7:49 PM),
https://www.ncnewspress.com/opinion/20180828/discussing-death-penalty-alter-
natives [https://perma.unl.edu/9CD4-CXFQ].
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influencing ballot measures since the campaigns are extremely expen-
sive. In the death penalty case, the funding from Governor Ricketts
was at least funding from a Nebraskan; as discussed in subsection
II.B.2, often, outside funders and special interest groups fund success-
ful ballot measure campaigns.161
Yet ballot measures are still the will of the people, or at least of the
majority of voters. As discussed in subsection II.A.1, ballot measures
are an effective means for voters to enact legislation when elected offi-
cials cannot––or will not––work together to legislate.162 When Ameri-
cans distrust the government and feel isolated from the political
process,163 ballot measures are a vehicle for civic engagement and pol-
icy change.164 For example, in 2018, Nebraska voters approved a bal-
lot measure to expand Medicaid in the state165 after the Nebraska
legislature failed to pass similar legislation for six years.166 Medicaid
expansion is a program created by the divisive Affordable Care Act,
which many state legislators––and Governor Ricketts––were reluc-
tant to support.167 The ballot measure energized volunteers across
Nebraska on both sides of the issue.168 Some Nebraskans saw the suc-
161. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
162. See Cohen, supra note 27 (“Many successful [ballot measures] seemed to rebuke
the polarizing and prejudicial rhetoric coming from the White House. With voters
across the political spectrum disillusioned by party leadership and the prevalence
of special interests [in] politics, the initiatives seemed to reassert the power of the
people, testifying to the impact of bottom-up democracy.”).
163. See supra notes 19–28 and accompanying text; see also David Lauter, Voters Dis-
trust Government in General, but Like Many Specifics, Poll Finds, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 23, 2015, 6:47 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-voter-trust-
20151123-story.html [https://perma.unl.edu/EG7A-AJUC] (highlighting results
of large-scale survey by the nonpartisan Pew Research Center in which “six in 10
respondents said they feel ‘frustrated’ by the government”).
164. For a discussion on how both political parties used ballot measures to increase
voter turnout in North Dakota, see John Hudak, How Ballot Initiatives Will Im-




165. Bruce Japsen, Nebraska Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion in Snub to Gov.
Ricketts, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:04 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejap-
sen/2018/11/07/nebraska-voters-approve-medicaid-expansion/#5bf4b2ab1565
[https://perma.unl.edu/L7ER-S4ED].
166. Henry J. Cordes, Nebraskans Approve Expanding Medicaid to Cover More of the




167. Japsen, supra note 165.
168. For a discussion of Medicaid expansion volunteer activities and citizen perspec-
tives before the election, see Michael Ollove, The Ground Game for Medicaid Ex-
pansion: ‘Socialism’ or a Benefit for All?, PEW (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.pew
trusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/11/05/the-ground-game-
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cess of the ballot measure as proof that “Nebraska legislators and
[Governor] Ricketts were ignoring their constituencies on a key
healthcare issue.”169
Unlike the death penalty referendum, where voters were deciding
whether or not to take away a right (freedom from execution) from an
unpopular minority (individuals convicted of murder), in the Medicaid
expansion initiative, Nebraskans voted to grant a right (access to
healthcare) to an unpopular minority (uninsured, low-income Nebras-
kans). Despite the challenges discussed by critics like Professor Eule,
ballot measures can be an effective way for voters to address a per-
ceived lack of social progress in the face of legislative inaction.170
Additionally, Nebraska’s constitution plainly states: “The first
power reserved by the people is the initiative whereby laws may be
enacted and constitutional amendments adopted by the people inde-
pendently of the Legislature.”171 This is a powerful statement—one
that says citizens can enact laws independent of the legislature. It
does not say that citizens can enact laws with a power lesser or
greater than that of the legislature; rather, the “first power [of the]
for-medicaid-expansion-socialism-or-a-benefit-for-all [https://perma.unl.edu/
A6BB-7EU6] (“Although there has been no public polling, even the speaker of the
state’s unicameral legislature, Jim Scheer, one of 11 Republican state senators
who signed an editorial last month opposing the initiative, said he is all but re-
signed to passage. ‘I believe it will pass fairly handily,’ he told Stateline late last
month.”); Hari Sreenivasan et al., Will Conservative Nebraska Vote to Expand
Medicaid?, PBS (Oct. 21, 2018, 4:54 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/
will-conservative-nebraska-vote-to-expand-medicaid [https://perma.unl.edu/
2TQ2-KDML].
169. Japsen, supra note 165. In 2017, Nebraska’s Grant County, with a population of
less than 650, was the county with the highest percentage of Affordable Care Act
(“ACA” or “Obamacare”) enrollees in the United States. Jessica Ravitz, Where
Trump Support and Obamacare Use Soar Together, CNN (Jan. 24, 2017, 4:22
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/24/health/nebraska-trump-obamacare-aca-
eprise/index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/Z75N-QPYT] (noting that 33% of the
county’s residents were enrolled in the ACA, compared to the national average of
5%). According to the article, the residents held complicated, and sometimes con-
tradictory, views of the health care act. Id.
170. See DuVivier, supra note 54, at 898 (“Addressing controversial issues through
‘fast-food government’ can promote the evolution of innovation. Because initia-
tives have been the first, or sometimes the only, successful mechanisms for ad-
dressing some progressive issues, they illustrate the benefits of this dispersed
form of federalism.”).
171. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 2. Additionally, the Nebraska constitution states:
The people reserve for themselves the power to propose laws and amend-
ments to the Constitution and to enact or reject the same at the polls,
independent of the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of
initiative. The people also reserve power at their own option to approve
or reject at the polls any act, item, section, or part of any act passed by
the Legislature, which power shall be called the power of referendum.
Id. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
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people”172 is simply independent. Accordingly, the appropriate level of
post-election judicial review of ballot measures is “legislative mirror-
ing”: courts should review the laws enacted as a result of a ballot mea-
sure with the same level of judicial scrutiny they would use for a
comparable piece of legislation passed or repealed by the legislature.
Thus, Nebraska courts should adopt a rule of pre-election defer-
ence to voters and post-election legislative mirroring when reviewing
ballot measures. In many ways, Nebraska courts are already putting
this rule into practice, but it is necessary to articulate it. Ultimately, a
pre-election deferential approach will mean that courts will largely al-
low ballot measure issues to be placed on the ballot for voters to decide
unless there are serious procedural deficiencies in proponents’ efforts
to get the issue on the ballot. It puts faith in the majority of voters to
make informed decisions, to be cognizant of the rights and perspec-
tives of minorities, and to participate meaningfully in democracy. Yet
by reviewing laws passed through ballot measures post-election with
the same level of deference used for laws passed through the legisla-
ture, Nebraska courts will protect the rights of minorities and individ-
ual liberties. Further, in treating popularly enacted laws the same as
legislatively created laws, Nebraska courts demonstrate that voters
are, in fact, “as good as they ought to be.”173
IV. CONCLUSION
The 2020 election is promising a continuation of the trend toward
voter-led ballot measures,174 including in Nebraska. In Nebraska,
campaigns are up and running for several proposed ballot measures,
including legalizing medicinal marijuana175 and casino gambling,176
172. Id. art. III, § 2.
173. See Tushnet, supra note 93, at 19.
174. See Bruce Japsen, More Red State Medicaid Ballot Campaigns Emerge for 2020,
FORBES (Sept. 8, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucejapsen/2019/
09/08/more-red-state-medicaid-ballot-campaigns-emerge-for-2020/#4c7a41655fa9
[https://perma.unl.edu/28SA-VYMG]; Caroline Kelly, Minimum Wage Activists
Look to 2020 Ballots After Midterm Success, CNN (Nov. 9, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2018/11/09/politics/minimum-wage-midterms-arkansas-missouri/
index.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2XSB-JZ8P].
175. Tom Angell, Nebraska Could Vote on This Medical Marijuana Ballot Measure in
2020, FORBES (Feb. 5, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomangell/
2019/02/05/nebraska-could-vote-on-this-medical-marijuana-ballot-measure-in-
2020/#74c9971252c7 [https://perma.unl.edu/M96F-4UY2]; Associated Press, Med-
ical Marijuana Petition Drive Running Strong in Nebraska, KMTV NEWS NOW
OMAHA (July 21, 2019, 11:51 AM), https://www.3newsnow.com/news/community/
vista-semanal/local/medical-marijuana-petition-drive-running-strong-in-nebra
ska [https://perma.unl.edu/A8CV-8GHS].
176. Associated Press, Nebraska Voters May Vote on Casino Gambling, FOX BUS.
(June 30, 2019), https://www.foxbusiness.com/personal-finance/nebraska-voters-
may-vote-on-casino-gambling [https://perma.unl.edu/V7RN-WEZL].
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and capping high payday loan interest rates.177 Other measures may
be on the horizon.178 Ultimately, direct democracy, including voter-led
ballot measures, “has a strong emotional pull cutting clear across the
political spectrum.”179
Yet state governors and legislatures are also pushing back against
voter-led ballot measures in two key ways: through overturning
passed measures and through passing legislation to make it more dif-
ficult for ballot measures to pass in the first place.180 Lawsuits are a
traditional method of delaying implementation of passed ballot mea-
sures.181 Recently, however, some lawmakers are seeking to outright
overturn ballot measures or change provisions of the voter-enacted
law.182 State legislatures are also passing new laws that make it more
difficult for issues to make it to the ballot in the first place,183 includ-
ing requiring a specific number of signatures per county or district,184
raising the percentage of the ballot vote needed for a measure to
pass,185 and moving up the signature collection deadline.186
Now, perhaps more than ever, the judiciary plays a crucial role in
improving the public’s trust in the “great experiment” that is the
177. Martha Stoddard, Capping Payday Lending Rates at 36% in Nebraska Is Goal of
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COLN J. STAR (July 2, 2019), https://journalstar.com/legislature/redistricting-rul-
ing-could-prompt-nebraska-ballot-initiative/article_94e4b7ee-39aa-5f88-8be2-
244c043a5a4b.html [https://perma.unl.edu/DC73-72KT].
179. Eule, supra note 48, at 1507.
180. Greenblatt, supra note 88.
181. Id.
182. Id.; see also Martha Stoddard, Nebraska Appleseed Files Lawsuit Seeking Earlier




that the nonprofit Nebraska Appleseed filed a lawsuit to order the Nebraska De-
partment of Health and Human Services to implement voter-approved Medicaid
expansion after the Department announced it would not implement the program
until two years after the ballot measure passed).
183. See Gary Fineout, Florida Lawmakers Tighten Ballot Measure Rules Ahead of
2020 Election, POLITICO (May 3, 2019, 10:28 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/
florida/story/2019/05/03/florida-legislature-takes-aim-at-ballot-measures-ahead-
of-2020-election-9178437 [https://perma.unl.edu/T85U-W86J] (describing how
Florida lawmakers passed legislation that requires ballot measure signature
gatherers to register with the state, prohibits paying hired signature gatherers
on a per-signature basis, and requires that ballot measures include language
about the budgetary and economic impacts of the measure).
184. Newkirk, supra note 9.
185. Greenblatt, supra note 88.
186. Id.
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United States.187 A rule of pre-election deference and post-election
legislative mirroring serves this interest as it balances respect for the
will of Nebraska voters with the concern for the rights of minority fac-
tions. If the current trend continues, there will be even more ballot
measures in Nebraska’s future. Thus, Nebraska courts should adopt
the pre-election deference, post-election legislative mirroring ap-
proach when reviewing challenges to those ballot measures.
187. Letter from George Washington to Catharine Sawbridge Macaulay Graham (Jan.
9, 1790) (on file with the National Archives, Washington, D.C.). The letter reads,
“The establishment of our new Government seemed to be the last great experi-
ment, for promoting human happiness . . . in civil Society.” Id.
